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Infectious disease is currently the main cause of mortality in the world and has been even
more important historically. This paper reviews recent research in economic epidemiology.
Specifically, it discusses the occurrence of infectious diseases and the effects of public health
interventions designed to control them. Several key points include: differences in the predictions
regarding short- and long-run disease occurrence between rational and epidemiological epidemics,
the nonstandard effects of interventions when epidemics are rational, the desirability and possibility









According to the 1997 WHO World Health Report, in 1996 there were about
52 million deaths world-wide. Infectious diseases caused about one-third of all
deaths and represented the primary cause of mortality.' Historically, the share of
world-wide mortality due to infectious diseases has been even greater, although
data tends to be less reliable for earlier periods. Morbidity and mortality from
infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, and acute respiratory infec-
tion have always been at the forefront of public policy in developing countries,
where infectious diseases accounted for almost one half (45%) of mortality in
1996. Worldwide concern about infectious diseases has once again peaked with
the onset of the most feared such disease of the twentieth century—the Hu-
man Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) that causes Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS).2 Like most communicable diseases, especially those that are
potentially fatal, HIV has incited an extensive governmental response, which has
consisted of regulatory measures, subsidies for research, education, treatment,
testing, and counseling. The broad scope of these and similar public interven-
tions, and the private behavior they aim to change, makes the use of economic
analysis in the study of their effects and desirability important.
Even though infectious diseases represent the primary cause of mortality
worldwide, health economists are just beginning to understand their behavior
and evaluate the many policies aimed at controlling their impacts. Indeed, cur-
rently, most research on the public control of infectious diseases is conducted
outside economics in the field of epidemiology.3 However, the evaluation of pub-
lic health measures from an economic perspective is particularly important, since
economic analysis separates the health effects of public policies from those of
private decision making. In particular, it is often argued that the public, rather
than private, control of infectious diseases is one of the main achievements of
modern public health. Indeed, relying on standard arguments about the positive
external effects of disease prevention, economists often echo such arguments for
an active public role in the prevention of infectious diseases, such as AIDS.4 On
the other hand, economists have rarely attempted to explain patterns of disease
occurrence or to evaluate public interventions in the context of a society with
individuals who do the best they can given their constraints. Recent analysis in
the rapidly growing field of economic epidemiology has cast considerably doubt
'The second leading cause at 28% was circulatory diseases, the third at 11% was cancers,
and the fourth at 6% was respiratory diseases.
2The Global Programme on AIDS of WHO, as well as Mann et al (1992), summarizes the
cumulative evidence on the prevalence of AIDS, and the mortality it has induced in the world.
See also Hongaarts (1996). Hloom and Carliner (1988) discusses the financial impact of the
epidemic in the US.
An early economic treatment of public health issues may he found in Weishrod (1961).
The dominant form of epidemiological analysis is exemplified by the treatments and references
contained in the works by Bailey (1975), Anderson and May (1991), Castillo- Chavez (1989),
Brandeau and Kaplan (1993), and Geoffard and Philipson (1995).
4See for instance Stiglitz (1997, p. 15) who argues in a recent World Bank report that "an
early and active government response encouraging safer behavior among those most likely to
contract and spread the virus has the potential to avert suffering and save millions of lives."
2on such textbook arguments by economists, on both theoretical and empirical
grounds.
This chapter outlines the contributions made so far by economic epidemiol-
ogy in explaining the occurrence of infectious diseases and helping to understand
the effects of public health interventions. The discussion will focus on three gen-
eral questions posed by this analysis:
1. How do economic and biological epidemiology differ in their predictions
about the short- and long-run behavior of infectious diseases?
2. How do they differ in their predictions concerning the effects of public
health interventions?
3. How do they differ in determining the welfare loss of a disease, and thus
in the priorities for eradication and control which should be assigned to
different diseases?
Section 2 begins by addressing the first question and considers the behavior
of rational epidemics. It stresses the central interaction between the extent of
disease, which is decreased by the demand for prevention, and the demand for
prevention itself, which is increased by the extent of disease. At the heart of
the analysis lies that an increase in the prevalence of infectious disease, i.e. the
share of the population infected, induces growth in private prevention. Although
epidemiological analysis surely discusses how various patterns of behavior affect
disease occurrence, it does not analyze the implications of how behavior change
in response to the new incentives created by the growth of a disease nor does it
analyze the effects these changes have on the desirability of public health mea-
sures. Central to the study of rational epidemics is thus the prevalence-elasticity
of private demand for prevention against disease. It represents the degree to
which prevention rises in response to disease outbreak. The means by which
preventive measures rise may differ across diseases. For example, the elasticity
for vaccine-preventable diseases may represent the number of additional vac-
cinations induced by each new infection, while that for sexually transmitted
diseases may represent the increases in the matching of sex partners who have
the same infection status.
This type of prevalence elastic behavior has two major implications: first,
growth of infectious disease is self-limiting because it induces preventive be-
havior; second, since the decline of a disease discourages prevention, initially
successful public health efforts actually make it progressively harder to eradi-
cate infectious diseases. We discuss a very general result concerning the inability
of private markets to eradicate disease when demand is prevalence-elastic. This
robust result does not depend on the market structure under which vaccines
are produced or on how expectations are formed about future levels of preva-
lence. The result stems from the existence of barriers to disease eradication on
both the demand side and the supply side. On the demand side, as the disease
disappears, so too does the demand for vaccines; the subsequent decline in vac-
cinations allows the disease to return. On the supply side, a patent-protected
3producer of vaccines has a special dynamic incentive to increase mark-ups: if
the vaccine eradicates the disease, the demand for the monopolist's product is
eradicated as well. Put simply, if there were fortunes to be made in disease
eradication, we would have more of it.
By considering the private incentives for preventive behavior, the economic
approach provides different predictions than that of epidemiology for the behav-
ior of epidemics. In particular, the two approaches predict a different relation-
ship between the hazard rate into infection and the prevalence of a disease. In
epidemiological analysis, this hazard rate is an increasing function of prevalence.
In other words, the larger the fraction of infected people in the population, the
larger is the fraction of uninfected people who become infected in the next pe-
riod. A higher prevalence increases the chance that a susceptible individual will
meet an infected individual. Economic incentives imply that the hazard rate
into infection may be a decreasing function of the prevalence of the disease,
when private demand for prevention is prevalence elastic. As the stock of in-
fected individuals grows, uninfected individuals face a larger risk of infection
and hence raise their demand for prevention. The sharp reductions in infection
hazards which often accompany outbreaks seem to provide empirical support
for economic, rather than epidemiological, epidemics.
Section 3 addresses the second question by analyzing the impact of public
health policies in general and their ability to eradicate infectious diseases in
particular. From the perspective of the current population only, eradication is
never Pareto optimal, because the benefits of lowering an almost extinct dis-
ease sooner or later fall below the cost of vaccinating more people. However, the
missing market is dynamic: future generations cannot pay vaccine producers for
the benefit they derive from the producers' product. Public interventions like
price subsidies and mandatory vaccination may complete this missing market,
but such measures have often failed to eradicate infectious diseases. Our anal-
ysis explains why eradication through such policies remains extremely difficult.
Price subsidies alone will not bring about eradication for the same reasons that
price reductions through increased competition will not. Both price subsidies
and mandatory vaccination programs are limited in their ability to achieve erad-
ication, because higher vaccination rates for individuals covered by any public
program lower the incentive of those outside the program to become vaccinated.
The prevalence-elasticity of demand lowers the price-elasticity of demand in the
case of subsidies and thus lowers the total demand effect of increased mandatory
coverage. As demand rises for those who are subsidized, demand falls among
those who are not. In the extreme case total demand is inelastic to subsidies.
This implies that classic economic justifications of Pigovian subsidies aimed at
solving the private under-provision of vaccines may be highly ineffective due
to these dynamic effects. In addition, the prevalence-elasticity of demand does
not only affect the long-run results of such interventions but also their short-
run results and thereby the Pareto optimal timing of public subsidy programs.
Prevalence competes with public interventions in inducing protective activity,
and this makes the timing of the public intervention a crucial factor in deter-
mining its economic efficiency. If the subsidy is not fast enough, the growth
4in prevalence has already induced protection; the public sector thus ends up
paying for behavior that would have been undertaken by the private sector of
its own accord.
Section 4 discusses the third question concerning the welfare loss induced by
a disease and the \velfare effects of R&D to develop new methods of prevention
or treatment. The implications for subsidization of R&D are quite different
from those involved in subsidizing prevention as discussed above. In setting
priorities among control efforts for many separate types of diseases, a major
question facing public health authorities is the welfare loss inflicted upon a
population by a given disease. The orthodox approach toward assessing disease
burden has employed several cost-of-illness ("COT") measures, each of which
is a product of prevalence and (possibly quality-adjusted) per-case severity of
a disease. This approach has the seemingly self-evident implication that the
more morbidity or mortality inflicted by a disease, the larger its welfare loss. In
contrast, we argue that the more prevalence-elastic is the demand for prevention,
the more this measure understates the total welfare loss. We interpret a disease
as a random 'tax' on behavior which risks exposure, a tax which will distort
individuals' consumption of risky behavior by inducing them to forego that
otherwise valuable activity. Standard tax analysis argues that a tax imposes
a burden in excess of the revenues collected by the public treasury if costly
tax avoidance occurs. Similarly, if costly disease-avoidance occurs, a randomly
collected disease tax on exposure imposes a burden beyond the case reports
of disease incidence collected by the public health authority. However, cost-
of-illness measures of the disease-induced loss, and indeed the measures used
by public health authorities,such as The World health Organization (WHO) or
The Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), are implicitly "revenue-
focused" in that they consider only the losses from morbidity and mortality and
ignore the excess burden of disease prevention. The major point we make is
that the standard cost-of-illness measures do not constitute a relatively large
fraction of the total welfare loss when prevention is prevalence elastic. This is
for the same reason that tax-revenue does not make up the major loss when tax-
avoidance is elastic. For example, almost all loss inflicted by vaccine preventable
diseases is from the excess burden. The case is similar for AIDS where the excess
burden consists of the quantity of sexual consumption foregone from fear of
infection. Many economists have argued that research expenditures on AIDS are
excessive given its relatively small case load. However, few diseases have caused
as much behavioral change as AIDS in terms of foregone sex which, if we were
to believe biologists, is perhaps the most valued human activity. Large research
expenditures to eliminate low-prevalence but behavioral diseases such as AIDS
may be justified because their total welfare loss, the case-load revenue and the
excess burden, is larger than for more common diseases. However, partial success
in R&D may lead to cut-backs in prevention behavior that thereby offsets such
medical advances.
Section 5 discusses existing empirical analysis of the type of prevalence-
elastic behavior that underlies the theoretical analysis reviewed. We consider ev-
idence for influenza, AIDS, and measles and attempt to estimate the prevalence-
5elasticity of demand for prevention. We review the results of a particular US
study that tracked the AIDS-preventive behavior of young individuals during
the 1980s, which saw rapid growth in the disease, using panel data from the US
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The prevalence elastic behav-
ior documented by this and other studies suggests the need to incorporate such
responses into the formulation of public health policy aimed at limiting the oc-
currence of disease. Finally, section 6 concludes by outlining several directions
for future research.
It should be noted that this chapter discusses a set of questions subjectively
selected from the recent health economic research literature in this area. Nat-
urally, a single review chapter cannot claim to cover everything that has been
and is being done in a rapidly expanding area of research, and this chapter is
no exception.5 This is a deliberate choice, since we find it more useful to focus
on a few ideas central to a research agenda, rather than provide a disjointed
discussion of an exhaustive reference list.
2Predictions about Disease Occurrence
This chapter first discusses the implications incentives have for the behavior
of both short-run epidemics and the long-run occurrence of disease. Economic
and biological epidemiology make different predictions about disease occurrence
mainly due to their different predictions about the relationship between preven-
tion and prevalence.
2.1 The Behavior of Rational Epidemics
Consider individuals who are classified into four health categories at a given
time t: susceptible S1, infected I, immune through recovery R1, and outside
the system. Normalizing the total population to unity, we refer to the fraction
infected in the population, I, as the prevalence of the disease. A future path
of prevalence is denoted II{I; st} and a future path of prices is denoted
pt E {ps; s ￿ t}, with the instantaneous demand for vaccines at time t for two
such paths denoted D(I,pt). We denote by b and in the birth and mortality
rates into and out of the system, respectively, by w the rate at which infected
individuals are withdrawn naturally from infection into immunity, and by the
probability of transmission conditional on exposure to an infected person. The






dR/dt =bD(It,pt) + w11 —mR1.J
5For example, we do not discuss the important literature on economic growth and AIDS: see
for instance Cuddingtoo (1993a-b) and Bloom (1997). Another area omitted is the statistical
literature by economists on AIDS forecasting (see e.g. Hay and Wolak (1990,1994)). For
alternative reviews on markets for vaccines, see Weisbrod and Huston (1987) and Panly (1994).
6The change in the fraction of susceptible individuals is due to the entry of
newborn individuals who do not vaccinate. Exits are due to new infections and
non-disease-related mortality. The change in the prevalence is due to the entry
of new infections, while exits are due to immunity and infection-related mor-
tality. New infections are caused by contact between susceptible and infected
individuals under random matching, as in the term /3S±I. The change in the
fraction of recovered immune individuals is due to the entry of newborn individ-
uals who vaccinate, as well as those individuals recovering from infection, and
the exits of agents through non-disease-related mortality.




The factor /3Sisthe rate at which infected individuals infect susceptible in-
dividuals with whom they come into contact, and the factor 1/(w + m) is the
average time of infection. For the infected stock to grow, the average number of
secondary infections by an infected individual must be above unity, so that an
infected individual more than replaces himself by the time he exits the infected
population. When there are only susceptible individuals, which is the relevant
case when a disease is to be eradicated, the secondary infections generated by
a single new infection is denoted p/3/(w+m), so that the disease can take
off in a completely susceptible population only when this rate is above unity.
2.2 Implications for Private Disease Eradication
A major technology aimed at limiting such diseases has been vaccines. Although
the introduction of a vaccine usually produces a sharp drop in the occurrence of
a disease, the eradication of vaccine preventable diseases predicted by many at
the time of these inventions has not been achieved except for smallpox.6 Of the
roughly forty vaccines on the market, only the smallpox vaccine has eradicated
its target disease. Diseases such as measles, tuberculosis, and different types of
influenza persist, despite explicit governmental efforts to eradicate them, and
recent attempts to develop a vaccine against HIV or AIDS raise important
questions about the causes behind these difficulties.
The prevalence-elasticity in private markets, coupled with rational demand
for vaccines, represent powerful forces which make it difficult for private markets
to achieve eradication. We call the demand for vaccines prevalence dependent if,
when prices are positive in the future, demand vanishes for low enough preva-
lence. That is, for any strictly positive price path yl, there is a prevalence path
It(pt) below which demand vanishes: D(It,pt) =0for all I 1t(pt) It can
be shown that prevalence dependent demand requires the simple condition that
the benefits of vaccination not be large "enough" when prevalence levels are low
enough. If demand is prevalence-dependent and if the prevalence goes to zero for
6See, for instance, Stephen Plotkin and Edward Mortimer (1988), and The World Bank
(1993).
7any future prices, there must be a time to after which the prevalence is driven
down to a level which generates small enough demand. As fewer individuals
vaccinate after to, the population becomes increasingly susceptible. However,
when an infection can regenerate itself in a susceptible population, which occurs
when p ￿ 1, this implies that the prevalence increases again, making eradica-
tion infeasible. In other words, the disease cannot be eradicated under positive
prices when p ￿ 1.
Since this argument holds for any prices, it implies that, regardless of the
market structure in which vaccines are produced, the disease is not eradicated,
since prices are presumably above costs in the long run for any feasible market
structure. In particular, although a vaccine monopolist is faced with a problem
similar to that of using an exhaustible resource, the resource (prevalence) will
never be exhausted. Naturally, if competition drives prices down to minimum
average costs of production, then eradication is not achieved under this market
structure either. Interestingly, this argument is not only robust to the type
of market structure, but also to many forms of expectations: it is true under
myopic as well as rationally formed expectations. The general difficulty with
eradication thus comes from the demand-side of the vaccine market, rather than
from the supply side.7
2.3 Rational Disease Dynamics of Epidemics
So far, we have not specifically investigated the demand for prevention and have
merely outlined the implications of various properties of this demand. Geoffard
and Philipson (1996) discuss an environment in which the rational protection
behavior of an individual in an epidemic can be traced out simply. A version of
this model is also discussed in Auld (1997). Given a utility function u(h, d) over
a binary demand for protection (d =1)and the state variable h representing the
susceptible (s)orinfected (i) health state. Proceeding heuristically to illustrate
the main ideas, the value function evaluated in the susceptible state may be
written as
V(s) =max{u(s,1) + nV(s), u(s, 0) + a[/311V(i) + (1 —(311)V(s)]}(2-3)
where a is the discount rate. This says that continued protection today
implies susceptibility tomorrow, but if the individual does not protect, he risks
becoming infected with a probability which increases in prevalence. This directly
implies that the individual remains exposed as long as the current benefit of
exposed activity outweighs the expected loss in the future due to risk of infection:
d =0u(s,0) —u(s,1) ￿ afllt[V(s) —V(i)] (2-4)
Protection in an epidemic is then characterized by a simple rule under which
the individual engages in protection only after a reservation prevalence, denoted
7For a contrary view see, for instance, General Accounting Office (1994) for a discussion
of why monopoly production of vaccines makes eradication infeasible.
8by K, has been reached. Solving for the value function, this reservation preva-
lence can be shown to satisfy
d=OI <Ka [u(s,1)—u(s,O)] (25)
/3[u(s, 1) —n(z,)I
In other words, there is a threshold prevalence below which an agent engages
in transmissive behavior and above which he engages in protection. Intuitively,
this reservation prevalence rises with the instantaneous cost of protection and
the discount rate, and falls with the cost of infection and the probability of
transmission conditional on exposure.
The dynamics for a closed population, which no agents enter or exit, can then
be traced out by assuming that the reservation prevalence levels are distributed
according to the cumulative distribution function F(K). The epidemic starts
with a prevalence level denoted I(K, 0) in the group with reservation level K
and then takes off by infecting in a given period those who have not started to
protect yet and have not been infected in the past
J10 fI(K,0)dF 26 It =ØI1QtG(It)
where G(I) fJ<K(1 —I(K,0))dFis the susceptible population choosing to
engage in transmissive activity at prevalence I and Qt E e'" represents
the share not infected in the past even though they were exposed. This func-
tion G summarizes the behavioral response of the population to the growth
in prevalence. For an epidemiological model in which behavior is exogenous
or prevalence inelastic, the function would be constant, that is, an increase in
prevalence would not cause any change in protective behavior. The degree to
which the population's protective behavior responds to an increasing prevalence
of a disease determines the epidemic behavior of the disease. More precisely,
Geoffard and Philipson (1996) outline the conditions under which the growth
of the epidemic reveals the preferences of the population, in the sense that the
risk attitudes of the population implicit in F can be identified through the time
path {it; t ￿ 0} of prevalence.
This characterization of behavioral response demonstrates how economic
models generate implications observably different from those generated by epi-
demiological models. The key implication concerns the hazard rate into infec-
tion from susceptibility and its relationship to the prevalence of a disease. The
hazard rate measures the propensity to be infected conditional on not being
infected yet. With the inelastic behavior assumed by epidemiological analysis,
this hazard rate is an increasing function of prevalence. In other words, the
larger the fraction of infected people in the population, the larger is the fraction
of uninfected people who become infected in the next period. As prevalence
rises, so does the chance that a susceptible individual meets an infected individ-
ual. This is true across a wide variety of epidemiological models, since they all
share the feature that the demand for exposure does not respond to prevalence.
9More precisely, if the demand for exposure is prevalence inelastic (C =1),then
the hazard function hj) satisfies:
h(I) =___ = = It. (2-7)
Therefore, the prevalence has a positive effect on the hazard rate of infection
Oh/UI ￿ 0.
In contrast, the incentives of epidemics imply that the hazard rate into
infection may be a decreasing function of the prevalence of the disease, because
an increase in risk provides a larger incentive for susceptible individuals to
increase protective behavior. In other words, although more and more people
may be infected as the epidemic grows, the share of still uninfected that become






It follows that the relationship of prevalence on the hazard rate is now given by
10/iiC 1
(2-9)
where r is the absolute value of the elasticity of C. It follows that
(2-10)
If the elasticity of the prevalence response is large enough, the hazard decreases
as a function of the prevalence. In particular, the elasticity needs to be larger
the larger is the prevalence, since the counteracting positive effect is more pro-
nounced. The more the behavior responds to the new risk, the lower is the
hazard rate into infection among susceptible people who have not already been
infected.
Figure 1 illustrates empirically the way hazard rates often fall and eventu-
ally level off as a result of a rising prevalence (see Geoffard and Philipson (1996)
and Auld (1997)). The curves are estimated using data from the San Francisco
Men's Health Study (SFMHS).8 The SFMHS, a longitudinal epidemiological
survey study, consists of 15 half-year waves of data for individuals living in San
Francisco during the period 1983-92, and is designed to yield data on the nat-
ural history of AIDS. The respondents were interviewed to obtain information
about behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs relevant to AIDS. The sample population
consisted of English-speaking, unmarried men aged 25-54. The survey sample
was a stratified two-stage sample of all households within the designated census
5See Geoffard and Philipson (1995) for details on the estimation and "Sampling Methods
and Wave 1 Field Results of the San Francisco Men's Health Study," Survey Research Center
Technical Report, University of California, Berkeley for the details on the sample design.
10tracts. All eligible persons in each selected housing unit were included in the
sample.
In the SFMHS, the duration of susceptibility is defined here as the number
of waves for which the individual remains HIV-negative, that is, the wave at
which he becomes infected. Such durations were observed under both left and
right censoring. In other words, HIV-positive individuals entered the first wave
and HIV-negative individuals were present at the end of the last wave.
FIGURE 1 INSERTED HERE
Figure 1 displays the prevalence rate and the hazard rate as functions of the
waves constructed from these data. The horizontal axis indicates the waves at
which the rates were measured. The estimated prevalence rates, I for wave t,
are plotted on the increasing (dotted) line and depict the percentage of individ-
uals in the survey who were HIV-positive at each wave. These prevalence rates
were estimated by computing, for each wave, the fraction of individuals present
throughout sampling who were HIV-positive in the sample. The hazard rates
are plotted on the generally decreasing (solid) line and depict, for each wave t,
the fraction of individuals present throughout sampling who were HIV-negative
in wave t —1,but turned H1V-positive during wave t.9 Due to the attrition
of subjects, the observed prevalence rates are not equivalent to the observed
hazard rates. The figure displays a negative relationship between the estimated
hazard rates and prevalence levels: the estimated hazard function is decreasing
and the cohort prevalence is increasing. The displayed relationship thus pro-
vides suggestive evidence for prevalence-elastic rational epidemics.'° Moreover,
the eventual flattening of the hazard rate around the 10th wave of the survey
corresponds to a complete reduction of new infections. This common pattern of
a sharp reduction in hazard rates into infection as epidemics grow is suggestive
of the type of prevalence elastic behavior discussed.
2.4 The Positive Effect of Prevalence on Assortative Match-
ing
In the case of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) such as AIDS, one form of
protective behavior may be the choice of safer partners. In the extreme case of
perfect "assortative matching" on infection status, i.e., when all HIV-positives
match with other HIV-positives and HIV-negatives with other HIV-negatives,
the growth of the disease is zero. Therefore, the degree to which incentives lead
to growth in infection-dependent matching of partners determines the growth
of a sexually transmitted epidemic.
Consider an environment which contains different classes of individuals whose
risk of HIV infection is known, and where risk is defined as the percentage of the
9By focusing on the propensity of HIV-negatives to become infected, the hazard rate is
different from the so-called incidence rate, which is the flow of new cases divided by the whole
population size.
10llowever, it is well known that such negatively sloped hazard functions may also be due
to unobserved differences among individuals (see, e.g., Heckman and Singer (1984)).
11class infected by the AIDS virus. Such classes may be subpopulations stratified
ou gender, appearance, weight, race, or other observable demographic character-
istics. Given this environment, determining who will engage in sexual activity
with whom, and what type of activity they will engage in determines the growth
of the disease. Specifically, it determines the demand for unprotected sex by
pairs of individuals, each of whom have a different infection status. The match-
ing of infected individuals with uninfected individuals is necessary to generate
new cases of the disease. The general theory of matching markets predicts
that among traders of different quality levels, high-quality traders will match
among themselves and low-quality traders will match among themselves (Becker
(1991)). In other words, low-risk individuals match up with other low-risk in-
dividuals, and high-risk individuals with other high-risk individuals. The com-
plementarity in health status that generates this assortative matching stems
from the fact that low risk individuals have more to gain by the choice of low-
risk partners than do high risk individuals. This has the important implication
that disease growth is slower than in the random matching case considered by
epidemiological analysis. Since the disease grows due to sexual partnerships be-
tween negative and positive individuals, the economic matching incentives slow
disease growth. Such matching may be interpreted to change the matching pat-
terns over the disease, inducing more dependence across the statuses of partners
as the disease grows.
For the case of HIV, Dow and Philipson (1996) estimated the extent both of
such assortative matching, as well as the extent to which such matching reduces
HIV incidence relative to the random matching assumed by epidemiological
models. They estimate that on average HIV-positive individuals are more than
twice as likely to have HIV-positive partners, and that this assortative matching
reduced HIV incidence by about one-third. They use the San Francisco Home
Health Study (SFHHS),'1 which is detailed enough to allow estimation of the
joint infection status of a pair of partners. The fraction of matches with a given





Pij is the fraction of couples of infection status (i, j),wherethe respondent's
infection status is given by i, while the respondent's partner has status j.If
i or jis0, the individual is uninfected. The prevalence of the disease among
respondents, p, or partners, q, is then defined as the marginal probabilities of the
tableT: p plo +pn and q po,+Pii. The degree to which there is assortative
matching on infection status is measured by the degree of positive dependence in
"The SFHHS is an epidemiological study designed to yield data on the prevalence of HI\T
and related risk factors in multicultural neighborhoods, including information about behavior,
attitudes, and beliefs relevant to HTV. The sampled population included persons currently un-
married, aged 20-44, and residing in San Francisco census tracts with substantial proportions
of blacks and Hispanics.
12the table. It is measured by the ratio S of the conditional probabilities of being
with a positive partner for positive respondents versus negative respondents,
p' (1—p)
(2-12)
In other words, the dependence is measured by the fraction of positive part-
ners of positive respondents, relative to the fraction of positive partners of neg-
ative respondents. Such matching is important for infection incidence since new
cases are generated only by contact between individuals of different infection
statuses. More precisely, the incidence in the table T (denoted ((T)) is given
by
((T)/3[Poi +pio], (2-13)
where /3, as before, is the probability of transmission and represents the likeli-
hood of an infection conditional on a match between an infected and a suscep-
tible individual.
For example, when there is no assortative matching as in epidemiological
analysis, 5=1. The incidence is then given by ((p, q, S =1)=/3[p(1
—q)+ q(1 —
p)].The matching independence assumption is inconsistent with the assortative
matching generated by the incentive of a non-infected individual to avoid infec-
tion. These incentives imply that S ￿ 1. As is well known, assortative matching
is not an assumption; rather it is implied by the fact that, ceteris pan bus, ev-
eryone prefers their partner to be negative rather than positive. Moreover, the
greater the morbidity or mortality of a disease, the stronger the incentive of
negatives to search for and match with other negatives.
Figure 2 illustrates the differences in the incidence for different levels of
assortative matching 8 consistent with a given prevalence level for the simplest
possible case, in which the prevalence levels of the respondents and partners
coincide: p =q.
FIGURE 2 INSERTED HERE
The top triangle depicts the disease incidence under the minimum assortative
matching consistent with the prevalence, the lower line depicts the incidence un-
der maximum assortative matching, and the oval shaped line depicts incidence
under infection-independent matching. In other words, the top triangle repre-
sents the largest number of matches between individuals of different infection
status consistent with a given prevalence level. The bottom x-axis represents
the lowest number, zero, since all negatives of one group can match with nega-
tives of the second group when the two groups have the same prevalence levels.
In the intermediate case, matches are infection-independent. For the SFHHS of
gays in San Francisco, the HIV-prevalence in the sample was roughly one half.
Since this rate is high, the figure implies that incidence predictions will be very
sensitive to different levels of assortative matching. Dow and Philipson (1996)
13estimated that an HIV-positive individual is more than twice as likely as an
HIV-negative individual to have a HIV-positive partner;S > 2. The incidence
reduction implied by such matching varies between 40 and 25 percent so that
in the figure the estimated incidence line is about a third of the way from the
independence line.12
2.5 The Effect of Immunity on the Prevalence of a Disease
With many infectious diseases, an individual can only be infected once and
is thereafter immune to future infections. In the case of such an immunity-
bearing infection, an infection may be a good which one is willing to pay for,
rather than a "bad" which one has to be paid to accept. This occurs if the in-
fection is more severe when caught in adulthood, so that a 'front-loaded' early
infection may be optimal. Many childhood infections have this feature, and
indeed the "get-it-over-with" attitude of parents reflects the value of early in-
fection. Absent manufactured artificial vaccinations, contracting and surviving
a disease represents the only means of "vaccinating" one's self, although at a
higher cost. Clearly, if there is no immunity conferred, front-loaded infections
fail to be optimal. Moreover, if the conditional risk of mortality remains con-
stant over an individual's lifetime, there is no incentive to receive immunity
through infection. However, consider such immunity-bearing infectious diseases
as chicken pox, measles, rubella, and mumps—often called child diseases, because
of the low average age of infection. Before vaccination was available, immunity
represented the only source of protection. Cohort studies of immunity-bearing
diseases conducted before vaccine development invariably showed that the frac-
tion ever-infected or currently infected in a given age cohort rises so rapidly
that, as the cohort reaches its late teenage years, around 95% of its members
have been infected. Nearly all of the remaining 5% share of the cohort escapes
infection for the remainder of their lives, so that the growth rate of cohort
prevalence goes to zero after the teenage years. This pattern held true for all
low-cost child diseases such as mumps, rubella, and chicken pox. For more se-
vere diseases, however, such as polio and diphtheria, cohort prevalence never
escalates to nearly universal seropositivity. Since infection confers immunity
at the cost of experiencing the disease, it may be interpreted as a purchase of
immunity similar to the purchase of medically manufactured vaccines. For low-
risk childhood diseases, it appears that the demand for such immuuity starts
out as high for young children, but goes to zero after the late teenage years.
This property is consistent with the following two factors: first, as expected
future lifetime falls, the benefits of lifetime immunity fall as well, so benefits are
highest for young children; second, the price of immunity (the morbidity cost
of infection) increases in age. For example, the risk of dying from childhood
'2Observed assortative matching may be infection-induced, in that infection may transform
a pair of partners with initially different infection status into a pair of partners with the same
status. The paper discusses how to isolate this infection-induced assortative matching from
incentive-induced assortative matching. Such couples, however, represent a small share of the
SFHHS.
14diseases rises with age. Both factors make early infection preferable to later
infection. Indeed, consumers may be willing to "pay" for their children to be
infected when vaccines are unavailable, as evidenced by the common practice
of having children sleep in the same bedroom with a sick sibling, or so-called
"measles parties." The apparent desire of parents for early immunity, whether
through infection or vaccination, reflects the fall of immunity's benefits and the
rise of infection cost with age. This incentive explains both the high rate of in-
fection for young people, and the extremely low rate of infection for individuals
past the late teenage years, after which the cost of infection increases steeply.
Epidemiologists explain such patterns in the age structure of disease through
school mixing patterns. Since infected children are more likely to meet suscep-
tible children when they are in school, the hazard rate into infection increases
in early school age. This assumes that the likelihood of infection conditional on
exposure remains constant across ages, but that exposure patternsdiffer across
ages. However, mixing is a choice governed by its costs andbenefits. Parents let
their children go to school in the potential presence of a disease when the pur-
chase of immunity through infection is on balance valuable. Parents react more
negatively when the infection bears no benefit as for diseases such as AIDS;
indeed, children with AIDS have faced pressure not to attend school.
153 Rational Epidemics & Public Health Inter-
ventions
The previous sections discussed some of the positive implications of prevalence-
elastic demand for disease occurrence. We \vill now discuss and evaluate several
types of public health interventions in light of such behavior of epidemics and
long-run prevalence.13
3.1 Public Price Subsidies
Economists have long offered qualitative arguments concerning the positive ex-
ternal benefits of vaccination, effects which result in the private under-provision
of vaccines. This has provided a motivation for Pigovian subsidies aimed at
correcting the under-provision. However, we find that the steady state price
elasticity of demand for vaccines is reduced under prevalence-elastic demand,
so that such subsidies become ineffective. Therefore, the Pigovian subsidies
traditionally seen as resolving the under-provision problem of vaccines can be
short-run, or out of steady state, arguments.14 Under a prevalence responsive
demand, the relatively low price elasticity may limit the efficacy of Pigovian
subsidies; in the extreme case, such subsidies may not raise total demand at all.
In the steady state, the fraction of individuals in each of the three health
states remains constant over time at levels (5,1, R), now denoted without time
indices. Denote by D(I,p) the demand for vaccination under a constant future
prevalence path at level I, where D < 0 and Dj ￿ 0. The positive sign of D1
we refer to as the prevalence response of demand. The benefit of vaccinatiou
rises with prevalence. It can also be shown that for each stationary price, there
is a unique steady state prevalence denoted 1(p), which is increasing in price and
locally stable.'5 Therefore, unlike many other dynamic economic systems, our
'31n predicting the effects nf public health measures on disease occurrence, the economic
approach differs from the epidemiological mainly in assuming that there is demand in the
private sector for disease prevention, which may or may not he advanced by efforts undertaken
in the public sector. The epidemiological approach fails to consider both the possibility of
privately provided disease prevention and the possibility that public interventions may be
rendered ineffective by private responses. Epidemiological models tend to credit reductions
in disease prevalence entirely to public interventions. Philipson and Posner (1993) provide a
basic qualitative discussion of the impact of private incentives on the AIDS epidemic and the
reduced role of public intervention. For a critique of this view, see Kremer (1995,1996).
14Most standard treatments of public finance or health economics discuss these Pigovian
subsidies for so called under-provided vaccines. See for instance Stiglitz (1988), Fuchs (1989),
and Phelps (1992) and Pauly (1994). Brito et al. (1991) argue that a 100percentvaccination
rate is not Pareto optimal. However, this does not seem to be unique to the externality of
vaccines—Pigovian subsidies may improve efficiency, but banning exposure-inducing behavior
altogether may carry efforts too far. Recent analysis by Francis (1997) Xu(1998), and Hsu
(1998) analyses the role of subsidies in a dynamic setting. Ainsworth and Over (1997) discuss
a particularly interesting application of these ideas to the problem of AIDS in developing
countries.
'5See Geoffard and Philipson (1997). We ignore the steady state (S, I, R) =(1,0,0)with
zero prevalence.
16model will not exhibit cycles, even with myopic demand: vaccination-induced
cycles can only occur with a lagged prevalence response of demand.
Using the unique and positive relationship between prevalence and price,
vaccine demand can be written as a function of price alone, as V (p) E V (1(p), p).
The total effect of a price increase on this demand then consists of not only the
standard direct negative effect, but also the indirect and positive effect through
increased prevalence:
(3-1)
The indirect positive effect depends on the degree to which prevalence rises with
price. This effect, in turn, falls with the prevalence response in demand D1, as
can be seen in the following steady state relationship:'6
'DJ+M!t1Th LJ,. (3-2)
As price increases, demand decreases, causing prevalence to increase. The rise
in prevalence creates a counteracting feedback by causing demand to increase.
This feedback limits the impact of price on prevalence. This counteracting effect
becomes larger as demand becomes more prevalence responsive. Consequently,
the total effect of price on demand falls with the prevalence response of demand
as can be seen by substituting 4,intothe expression for D:
1IV. (3-3)
The total price effect turns out to be the partial effect discounted by a factor
which falls with the prevalence response of demand. In sum, the larger is the
prevalence response of demand, the less it responds to price.
When public subsidies vary with prevalence, as denoted by s(I),wecall them
counter-cyclical if s'(I) < 0, or pro-cyclical if s'(I) > 0. Without a doubt, the
majority of public sector subsidy programs, whether international, national, or
sub-national, are pro-cyclical. Once we consider prevalence dependent subsidies,
the total steady-state demand function becomes
D8(I,p) ED(I,p—s(I)). (3-4)
The total prevalence response of demand is then
=Di—sjD. (3-5)
An increase in prevalence affects subsidized demand directly, and indirectly by
raising the level of subsidies under a pro-cyclical policy, or lowering the level
under a counter-cyclical policy. An increase in subsidization induces a decrease
16See Geoffard and Philipson (1997).
17in price and vice-versa. One can also show that the larger is the prevalence
response of demand, the lower is the steady state prevalence I; formally, I
is lower whenever Dj is uniformly larger.'7 This directly implies, therefore,
that a pro-cyclical subsidy policy lowers steady state prevalence more than a
connter-cyclical policy. Furthermore, since demand varies less with price when
the prevalence response of demand is larger, pro-cyclical subsidies mitigate the
effects on quantity of a less competitive market structure.
For a competitive market facing a stationary subsidy s, the market eradicates
the disease only if the subsidy covers the minimum average cost of production.
On the other hand, a monopoly producer of vaccines faces an unconventional
incentive to keep the disease alive: if the disease is eradicated, so is the de-
mand for the monopolist's product. Consider a monopolist who faces constant
marginal costs c. Clearly, the monopoly price can never fall below the subsidy
level since demand is completely price inelastic at such a price. If the monopoly
price equals the subsidy, the vaccine is free to consumers who demand it univer-
sally, as in D(O) =1.Universal demand is assumed to lead to eradication after





Whenthe monopoly price p exceeds the subsidy s, we do not have universal
demand. In this case, profits are given by:
= — c)D(p—s)edt (3-7)
If there exists a price p such that 11N > HE, the_monopolist will not eradicate the
disease. This condition is equivalent to (s_c)D(O)(l_c_OT) > (p—c)D(p—s).
This condition demonstrates the crucial point that eradication is less likely to
he profitable the more prevalence-elastic is demand. High prevalence elasticity
implies that D will below, and thus D(p—s) will not be much lower than D(O).
A monopolist facing inelastic demand will never find it profitable to eradicate,
because the short-term increase in quantity offered by eradication will not be
large enough to compensate for the zero future profits offered by eradication.
The monopolist chooses eradication provided that the current profits from
universal vaccination exceed the loss in future profits from the elimination of
the disease. However, the important point here is that eradication is less likely
to be profitable the more responsive is demand to prevalence. This is so because
eradication is less profitable the less demand responds to price and, as discussed,
D falls with D1. When demand is price inelastic, it never pays to eradicate be-
cause the monopolist earns a loss both before and after the disease is eradicated:
a loss after eradication (as discussed) because his product is valueless, and a loss
before eradication because raising the price will increase current profits. In ad-
dition, if future profits are not heavily discounted, so that a is high, the cost of
'7For a proof, see Geoffard and Philipson (1997).
18eradication is higher. In sum, if demand is highly responsive to prevalence or if
discounting is moderate, subsidized eradication is not profitable.'8
3.2 Mandatory Vaccination
Virtually all observed mandatory vaccination programs are partial—they do not
cover whole populations or even whole age groups. Therefore, private decisions
to vaccinate outside of public programs remain an important component of the
total demand for vaccination. The total demand when a public program covers
a fraction f of the population is given by
DT(I,p, f) =I+ (1 —f)D(I,p). (3-8)
The first term is the mandatory demand in the program, while the second term
is the private demand outside the program. Partial mandatory programs crowd
out the private demand for vaccination outside the program, in the sense that
some individuals would vaccinate in the absence of the program, but will not
vaccinate in its presence.'9 More precisely, the marginal effect on demand of
increased public coverage is
dDT= [1-DI + (1- f)D111. (3-9)
The first term is the direct positive effect resulting from the increased public
coverage of individuals who otherwise would not have vaccinated. The second
term is the indirect negative effect on private demand by individuals not covered
by the public program. It reflects the negative effect on demand exerted by
a decrease in prevalence. This term increases in the prevalence response of
demand. Therefore, the higher the prevalence elasticity, the less effective are
mandatory vaccination programs at raising total demand.
3.3 The Pareto-Optimal Timing of Epidemic Interventions
Critics of the public response to the AIDS epidemic commonly charge that public
health interventions occur "too late" into the epidemic. Table 1 below summa-
rizes the speed at which state governments in the U.S. responded to the AIDS
epidemic, as measured by expenditures on prevention programs. The table is
computed using data on the time elapsed before states implemented programs
'tSubsidized suppliers, rather than demanders, may not be prevalence elastic under so called
supplier-induced demand. Supplier subsidization was undertaken in England in 1990when
general practitioners received bonuses if they achieved prespecifled immunization targets for
their patients. The fraction who achieved the targets increased from 55% at the start to 85%
at the end of the program in 1992 (Principal Medical Officer, Department of Health, England,
1994). This policy raises the interesting question of whether health activities with positive
external effects, such as those in many areas of public health, may be efficiently provided by
supplier-induced demand.
crowdingout effect is one possible interpretation of the relatively low pre-school
vaccination rates in the U.S., given the mandatory vaccination required in public schools.
19for education about AIDS prevention, the main type of public preventive expen-
diture program in the U.S. A row of the table corresponds to a given fiscal year.
The first column (Total Left) refers to the number of state governments that had
not implemented an education program at the start of the fiscal year; this rep-
resents the survival rate of non-implementation. The second column (Starters)
indicates the number of governments that started an education program during
that fiscal year; this represents the exit rate from non-implementation. The
third column (Survival) indicates the fraction who survived, or the fraction of
state governments which had not implemented an education program by the
start of the next fiscal year. Lastly, the 95% confidence intervals are reported
for this survival curve.
TABLE 1 INSERTED HERE
The table reveals the frequently discussed slowness of the public sector's
response (see, e.g., Shilts (1987)). This is illustrated by the fact that, even
in 1988, well into the national epidemic, more than half of the states had not
established prevention programs. The common focus on the calendar timing of
the public response is misleading, however, since it is disease prevalence, not
disease duration, that determines incentives for protection in the private sector.
The rapidity of public-sector response should be judged in relation to prevalence
levels, since the latter drive private incentives for protection.
Figure 3 below depicts the resulting relationship between state implementa-
tion of education programs and state prevalence levels. Specifically, the figure
shows the share of US state governments as a function of disease prevalence in
the state that had not yet adopted an AIDS education expenditure program. It
is the survival curve of the duration until program adoption where the duration
is measured in terms of the prevalence level.20
FIGURE 3 INSERTED HERE
The figure illustrates that disease prevalence increases adoption of public
programs, and that the rate of adoption rises with prevalence, as evidenced by
the convexity of the survival curve. While calendar response times do not affect
private incentives, the slov calendar response and the rapid prevalence response
of governments suggest that calendar response times may also be uncorrelated
with the public sector incentives.2'
What determines the Pareto timing of an intervention into an epidemic
caused by a population that is heterogenous in the willingness to bear risk?
To gain insight into the efficient timing of a subsidy program, consider first the
effect of a complete subsidy to a single individual, which \vill not affect overall
20We measure AIDS prevalence as AIDS cases reported to the Centers for Disease Control,
per 100,000stateresidents.
21lndeed, the unconditional correlation between calendar duration and prevalence duration
turns out to be close to zero. For example, the District of Columbia responded first in terms
of calendar time, but last in terms of prevalence.
20prevalence I,. The impact of the subsidy on the behavior of this single indi-
vidual depends on whether the prevalence has already reached that individual's
threshold prevalence K. If the prevalence has reached this threshold prevalence,
the subsidy has no effect on that individual. This implies that a subsidy to a
heterogeneous population affects only those individuals with a larger threshold
prevalence .Moreprecisely, the prevalence and the public subsidy program are
competing incentives influencing the individual demand for protection, which
implies that subsidy programs may not be Pareto-optimal if they are under-
taken when prevalence is too high. If they come in too late, the subsidies may
be irrelevant for a large share of the population for whom prevalence itself has
already induced protection. This may appear counter-intuitive, since it suggests
that the larger the case load, the smaller is the role for government intervention
through subsidies. However, as prevalence rises, the private incentive to un-
dertake protective conduct also rises, thereby lowering the effect of government
subsidies.
Consider the aggregate effect of a typical subsidy program which is financed
by non-eligible individuals. Let C0(p, I) and G5(p, I) denote the share exposed
in the dynamic model for non-eligible and eligible individuals of the program,
respectively. For a program involving a percentage subsidy of s for protective
activity, there is a potential for Pareto improvement only if non-eligible indi-
viduals are willing to pay eligible individuals to demand protection, and they
are willing to pay an amount at least equal to the program cost. The following
proposition shows that this can never be the case if the subsidy program starts
"too late," in terms of disease prevalence. More precisely, it can be shown that
for every subsidy level s, there exists a limit prevalence level I(s), such that the
subsidy program is not Pareto-improving if it starts after prevalence has reached
I(s). Moreover, the limit prevalence level I(s) decreases with s. The higher the
proposed subsidy, the larger must be the benefit of the program. Therefore, the
program must be undertaken at lower prevalence levels in order to have greater
effects. Interestingly, at the later stages of an epidemic, lower subsidization
levels outperform higher levels.
The revenue for such a subsidy program would come from non-eligible indi-
viduals. Self-interested individuals who have already been induced by disease
prevalence to engage in protective behavior, however, will pay nothing for other
individuals to engage in protective behavior, since they have nothing to gain
from others' protective activity.22 If a public program is not fast enough, the
growth in prevalence will thus have eliminated the willingness of some individ-
uals to pay for others to engage in protective activity.
22This cap on the external benefit from protective behavior may he particularly relevant
to explicitly choice-based diseases such as HIV, since many individuals may find protective
behavior to be costless, or even preferable. For example, monogamous married couples may
have to be compensated to engage in transmissive activity with high-risk groups.
213.4 The Dynamic Welfare Effects of Eradication
Any evaluation of a disease eradication policy will depend crucially on the way
dynamic, rather than static, externalities are considered. This is so because a
main benefit of an eradication program eliminates the costs of disease prevention
in the future. For the current population, eradication is never optimal, because
the marginal costs of vaccination eventually outweigh the benefits of further
decreases in disease prevalence. However, there is a missing intergenerational
market: fnture generations cannot pay vaccine producers for the benefit of erad-
ication, although collectively they benefit most from an eradication program23.
To consider the dynamic value of an eradication programs, let the lower
bound fluonthe willingness to pay for eradication by future generations be
given by the net-present value of these future prevention expenditures; using
the demand for vaccination D, we can write this as:
\ —at
B Ej D(p)pe_atdt=pp1e (3-10)
t=T a
On the other hand, the cost of any efficient eradication scheme cannot exceed
the upper bound B, the cost of universal vaccination for T periods (where T is
the length of time necessary to achieve eradication under universal vaccination).






Theupper bound must be the cost of subsidizing everyone, since vaccination
demand goes to zero as prevalence goes to zero. The prevention expenditures
avoided are thus larger than the required subsidies whenever
(342)
The discount factor a crucially determines the desirability of eradication. If
the discount factor is zero then eradication is always desirable for all demand
functions, since the value of the future prevention eliminated always exceeds
the current cost of the eradication program. On the other hand, if there is
full discounting, and a becomes very large, eradication is always dominated by
the free-choice equilibrium. In addition, a longer eradication program naturally
makes eradication relatively more costly, as does a low level of demand caused
by high prices or other features of the disease.
It is useful to compare this dynamic social problem to the dynamic problem
of a subsidized monopolist. In the social problem, the benefits of eradication
accrue in the future, but in the monopolist's problem, eradication sends future
profits to zero. The discount factor thus has different effects in the two problems:
less discounting makes the monopolist less likely to eradicate, although he is
23There are other potential benefits of eradication not discussed here such as the elimination
of a mutation or drug-resistent strain of a virus.
22more likely to improve welfare. Thus, a deficit-financed eradication program,
which spends beyond tax revenues during its operation but recoups the deficit in
future generations, may improve welfare when discounting is at current market
rates. Such a program would allow for the inter-generational transfers necessary
to pay current generations to over-vaccinate for the benefit of future generations,
who will not purchase vaccines from their manufacturers.
If eradication is to be achieved, there is still a choice between the regulatory
approach of mandating demand and the fiscal approach of subsidizing it. Given
the difficulty of subsidies relative to mandates the fact that larger distortionary
taxes are needed for the latter only enforces the superiority of the regulatory
approach. However, dependent on the cost of enforcing the regulations, and
the distortionary taxes needed for that purpose as well, there may well be a
trade-off between the two methods.
3.5 Public Intervention into Allocations of Information
Many public health interventions involve the dissemination or regulation of in-
formation. This is particularly true for sexually transmitted diseases such as
HIV where screening, partner notification, education, confidentiality legislation,
or surveillance reporting to the population are all part of the public arsenal.
The effect of changes in the allocation of information, of "who knows what and
when," cannot be studied using epidemiological analysis, because changes in
the allocation of information do not change behavior in epidemiological analy-
sis. This excludes explicit analysis of the effects and desirability of the bulk of
public AIDS-prevention spending in the United States and abroad, on education,
antibody testing, and counseling services for individuals at risk of acquiring or
transmitting HIV. Virtually all fiscal institutions which have responded to the
HIV-epidemic, whether international, national or sub-national, have included
HIV education and testing in their prevention efforts.24
To evaluate public education programs, we must recognize that the infor-
mation structure of a disease determines its growth and prevalence. \Ve may
regard the case of an "asymptomatic" disease such as HIV as a case of imper-
fect information—a person may harbor HIV even in the absence of any symptoms
observable to his partner. Specifically, if we regard symptomatic disease as pro-
viding perfect information, asymptomatic disease corresponds to the case of
asymmetric information. The classic paper by Akerlof (1971) first studied the
effects of such information problems on the volume of trade in economic mar-
kets. If one interprets sex as an economic trade in the sense of being an activity
which is ex ante beneficial to both parties involved, the problem of AIDS can
be viewed as a problem of quality uncertainty among traders. In such a mar-
ket, traders may learn their quality status through HIV testing. Incomplete
24BIoom and Cued (1991) first considered the incentives of private employment based HIV-
screening, hut were not concerned with the three main questions of this survey. They con-
sidered the lack of private demand for employer HIV-tests of employees for the purpose of
reducing the costs of employment-based health insurance. They calculate that due to the low
prevalence of the disease, the costs outweigh the benefits relatively more for smaller firms.
23information will inefficiently restrict the volume of trade when traders forego
mutually beneficial trades, which would take place under perfect information,
for fear of trading with a bad partner. Similarly, HIV risk may cause pairs of
susceptible individuals not to engage in mutually beneficial unprotected sex for
fear of infection. In the extreme case of perfect information about infection
status, this information theory predicts that infected individuals will engage in
sexual activity only with other infected individuals and noninfected individuals
\vill engage in it only with noninfected individuals—the degree of information
determines the degree of assortative matching in the population. The privately
determined disease growth rate would be much smaller under perfect informa-
tion, zero under full assortative matching, indeed so small as to wipe out the
disease.
Philipson and Posner (1995) and Boozer and Philipson (1997) analyze the
private demand for information in this market and the effects of public subsidies
on information acquisition. The theoretical analysis implies that mainly low-risk
HIV-positive and high-risk HIV-negative individuals will alter their beliefs and
behavior due to public information subsidies, and that the aggregate response
to such a program may be small, because the effects across such risk groups
are offsetting. This is analyzed empirically using a longitudinal survey that im-
itated a public HIV testing program by actually administering an HIV test as
part of the survey—the San Francisco Home Health Study (SFHHS), collected
by the AIDS Prevention Center at the University of California at San Francisco
(UCSF) during 1988-89. The survey recorded the beliefs and sexual activity
of individuals before and after the testing. Using this direct evidence on the
effects of providing traders with private information, the analysis assessed the
longitudinal impact of such a public information intervention. Consistent with
the theoretical discussion, the study found that knowledge of one's HIV status
increased the volume of sexual contact by 16 percent for high-risk HI\Tnegative
respondents and had little effect on high-risk HIV-positives. Mechonlan (1998)
provides an interesting analysis of the aggregate implications of these incen-
tives for disease prevalence. He shows that not only does prevalence rise with
subsidization of testing, but testing also reduces welfare.
The responsiveness of high-risk negative individuals and low-risk positive
individuals calls into question the rationale for public education and testing
programs. If such programs target high-risk groups, they do little to alter be-
havior favorably. Only those agents who actually learn something modify their
behavior—the positive low-risk and negative high-risk traders. Indeed, the high-
risk negatives subsequently engage in sexual intercourse with a greater number
of partners, potentially placing them at greater risk of a new infection. The
theoretical analysis and empirical results suggest that a public testing program
can have unintended effects, particularly when focused on high-risk populations.
244 The Welfare Loss of Disease and Medical Tech-
nology
In setting priorities among control efforts across many separate types of diseases,
a major question facing public health authorities is the welfare loss inflicted
upon a population by a given disease. The orthodox approach has employed
several cost-of-illness ("COT") measures, each of which is a product of prevalence
and (possibly quality-adjusted) severity of a disease. This approach has the
seemingly self-evident implication that the more morbidity or mortality inflicted
by a disease, the larger its welfare loss. This section discusses the economic
welfare loss incurred due to infectious diseases and then compares it to such
common public health measures of this loss. The analysis is founded on the idea
that standard welfare analysis of taxation may applied to the welfare effects of
regulating diseases when interpreting exposure to disease as a valuable good, and
the expected cost of incurring the disease, here becoming infected, as a "random
tax" on the consumption of this good25. The principal result is that the cost-of-
illness measures cannot comprise a relatively large fraction of the total welfare
loss when private prevention is prevalence-elastic; the main welfare loss of a
disease will then consist of the distorted behavior the disease induces.
If a disease is interpreted as a tax on the consumption of exposure to the
disease, the disease 'distorts' consumption to involve preventive activity that
would not have been undertaken in absence of the disease. This 'excess burden'
of the disease tax represents the main difference between public health measures
of disease cost, which consider only the direct cost imposed on those infected by
a disease, and an economic measure of the disease, which includes the cost of the
distorted preventive behavior. Since not all individuals who consume the good
(expose themselves to the disease) contract the illness, the tax is paid randomly.
Public health measures of the loss inflicted by a disease, such as cost-of illness
measures, are invariably comprised of the product of the total number of cases
and the cost of each case. This represents only the 'revenue' part of the disease
tax, thereby ignoring the excess burden due to the distorted behavior. The case
of polio illustrates this point—there are currently no infections in the United
States but each child has to be vaccinated. According to a revenue-focused
measure of welfare loss from disease, polio induces zero loss in welfare, although
were it not for polio expenditures of time and money on its prevention could be
used more productively
To consider the welfare loss of a disease let 9 E u(s, 0) —u(i,0) denote
its per-period cost of infection as discussed in the individual decision problem
in previous sections. Technological medical advances may reduce this cost of
infection through new treatments. Let 1(8) be the prevalence under a given cost
and denote by D(8) E D(I(8), 8) the steady state demand for prevention. If L
denotes the steady-state welfare loss it was shown to be given by:
L D(8)C + (1 —D(8))I(8)8 (4-1)
25See Philipson (1995).
25where C is the cost of prevention. Here, the first term reflects the excess burden
the disease imposes on individuals who do not consume exposure given the
implicit disease-tax on such activity. The second term reflects the loss suffered
by those who engage in exposure despite this tax, that is, individuals who will
eventually make up the case-load. This is the revenue part of the total welfare
loss of a disease. If the disease does not induce harm the welfare loss is zero;
6 =Uimplies D(6) =Uand hence L =U.Figure 4 shows the differences between
the two types of welfare losses as a function of the cost of infection.
FIGURE 4 INSERTED HERE
The COT measures of the welfare loss of disease, usually a product of the
prevalence and the quality-adjusted per-capita cost of a disease, focuses solely
on the second term of this loss by ignoring the distortions induced by the disease.
The COl measures of public health correspond to the revenues or 'Laffer'-curve
LPH of the disease. When demand is prevalence elastic, then the COT measure
may take on the inverted U-shaped feature because a rise in the costreduces
prevalence so that their product may not be monotonic; the COT measure may
claim that a more costly disease is welfare improving.
The effect of a reduced cost of infection through improved treatments, that
is, reductions in the parameter 6, are determined by
—= Do[I6—C]
—(1—D)[196 + I] (4-2)
The first term is reduction in the welfare loss due to the reduced distortions
and the second term is the reduction due to the lowered average cost on those
who choose to consume exposure. The special case of COT analysis applies when
demand is completely inelastic. Then the reduction in the welfare loss would
be the reduction in the COl measure by the corresponding reduction in the
per-capita cost of infection
(4-3)
However, this highlights the difference in welfare effects of public efforts
to change the cost of infection 6 dependent on whether behavior is prevalence
elastic. If new medical technology lowers the consequences of disease, more con-
sumption of exposure will take place thereby partly offsetting the public health
achievements For example, for AIDS the recent new treatments of protease
inhibitors will reduce distorted behavior, here safe sex thereby having an offset-
ting effect on prevalence. AIDS causes an excess burden in terms of foregone
sexual consumption26. The existence of this excess burden is indeed why the
case-load is so small and the disease is self-limiting. Nonetheless, most public
2eThe asymptomatic nature of HIV may make this burden especially large, because, as dis-
cussed above, even two uninfected people may inefficiently choose to abstain from unprotected
sex.
26health authorities (e.g.,theWorld Health Organization (WHO) and the Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)) remain focused entirely on the
direct cost of the illness and ignore the excess burden. However, when behavior
is prevalence elastic the excess burden will dominate the total welfare loss of
disease for serious diseases.
5 The Evidence on Prevalence Elastic Behavior
Many of the discussed implications for the behavior of epidemics as well as
for the impact of public health interventions stem from the positive relation-
ship between preventive behavior and disease prevalence. This section discusses
empirical estimates of this relationship.
Ahituv etat.(1996) investigates the degree to which the local prevalence
of AIDS increases the demand for disease-preventing methods of contraception
among young adults. Using data from the National Longitudinal Surveyof
Youth (NLSY), they find the use of condoms to be quite responsive to the
prevalence of AIDS in one's state of residence, and they find this responsiveness
to have grown over time. Using both cross-sectional and longitudinal evidence,
they find that a one percent increase in the prevalence of AIDS in one's home
state increases the propensity to use a condom by up to 50 percent. Small levels
of growth in AIDS prevalence have thus resulted in enormous growth in the
demand for condoms.
In the U.S., AIDS has been spread primarily through unprotected sexual in-
tercourse, especially, although not exclusively, among homosexual males. Sexual
activity accounted for transmission in over 70 percent of all U.S. AIDS cases
diagnosed through June 1992; of these cases, 90.6 percent resulted from homo-
sexual contact. Over the last several years, however, the number of new AIDS
cases in which transmission occurred by a means other than sexual contact, such
as intravenous drug use, has grown more rapidly than the number of new cases
due to sexual transmission. In addition, transmission via heterosexual contact
has increased over time. Ahituv etatexamine the extent to which one form of
protection from STDs, condom use, has responded to the increased prevalence
of AIDS among young adults in the US. They focus on the demand for con-
doms particularly because of its suggested importance in stanching the spread
of AIDS. Using data from several large cohorts of youth over the second-half
of the 1980s, they present evidence on how local AIDS prevalence affects the
demand for contraception or, more precisely, they estimate the elasticity of de-
mand for condoms with respect to AIDS prevalence. While many other studies
had examined the nature of sexual activity under STD risk, none had attempted
to estimate prevalence elasticities. In addition, unlike those of prior studies, the
data set used in this study spanned the entire 1980s, so that behavior before
and after the epidemic could be compared. This is a major advantage of the
NLSY over other sources of data on AIDS. The paper analyzes a subsample
of the NLSY, namely individuals aged 25 through 27. For the sample years
1984, 1986, and 1990, 8924 respondents fall into this age category, and these
27respondents generate a total of 11,351 person-year observations.
In sum, it is found that condom demand rose substantially among 25 through
27 year-old people over this period. In particular, while not finding differences in
condom demand across regions in 1984, before AIDS was very prevalent, they
find that condom demand became geographically heterogeneous as the AIDS
epidemic spread, with a higher growth of condom use in states with higher
AIDS prevalence rates. Moreover, the highest rates of increase occurred among
sexually active, single men and single men living in urban areas, all of whom
are generally expected to have higher exposure to the risk of HI\T infection.
Although other factors might account for this regional change, these patterns
strongly suggest that young adults altered their level of protection against STDs
in response to increased risks.
The use of personal and state-level characteristics as controls for regional
demand does not alter, and sometimes strengthens, the conclusions of this anal-
ysis. Specifically, young adults exhibit a prevalence-elastic demand for condoms,
and the elasticity rises among men, blacks, unmarried people, urban residents,
and more sexually active individuals who face a greater risk of HI\T exposure.
Moreover, prevalence-elasticity has increased substantially over time: condom
demand does not differ across states before the epidemic, but as the epidemic
progresses, the interstate differences grow. Finally, theauthors find that in-
creases in the prevalence of AIDS in one's state of residence explain more than
half of the dramatic rise in condom use which took place among young adults
in the second half of the 1980s. The prior analysis treats the NLSY as a set of
repeated cross-sections. Exploiting its longitudinal features, however, the rate
of condom adoption is still found to be significantly higher for individuals living
in areas with higher growth rates of AIDS prevalence.
Table 2 shows the prima facie evidence for the relation between differences in
condom demand and differences in AIDS prevalence. It compares, within a given
year, the demand for condoms broken down by quartilesof the AIDS prevalence
rate in the respondent's current state of residence. These results are presented in
Table 2, which displays the proportion of individuals using condoms by quartile
as well as the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that condom use inthe
first quartile equals that in the fourth. Condom demand does not differ across
quartiles of AIDS prevalence in 1984 for any of the demographic groupings.
However, in subsequent years, the quartiles begin to diverge, with individuals
in higher prevalence states using condoms more frequently. In both 1988 and
1990, condom use consistently increases across quartiles, and these increases are
statistically significant.
TABLE 2 INSERTED HERE
Analysis of the longitudinal NLSY data reveals the same trend: the growth
rate in condom use differs across quartiles of the growth rate of AIDS prevalence
between 1986 and 1988, as well as between 1988 and 1990, but it does not
differ across quartiles between 1984 and 1986. The higher the growth of risk,
the more likely is growth of preventive behavior. In addition, condom use by
28married individuals does not respond to movements in AIDS prevalence. This
is consistent with the theory, since such individuals represent a control group
which does not face increased risk of infection from increased rates of prevalence.
In order to investigate the robustness of these patterns, they presented re-
sults for four alternative empirical specifications of individual-level, reduced-
form demand functions for condoms. In each, they control, in various \vays, for
personal and regional characteristics other than the state-level AIDS prevalence
rates in order to better isolate the effects of regional and temporal changes in the
full price of unprotected sex. They control for the pecuniary market price for
condoms by using year and state dummies, so that any uncaptured differences
in price must come from possible but unlikely within state and year variation
in condom pricing. Table 3 shows the estimated prevalence elasticities bro-
ken down by year and by various demographic subgroups, for the most general
empirical specification considered.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The significantly negative prevalence elasticities in 1984 and 1986 appear
to be consistent with the claim of public health officials that low condom use
contributed to the spread of the epidemic. However, these significantly negative
coefficients become transformed into significantly positive coefficients for almost
all demographic groups except married men, as claimed.
Although this evidence relates to the demand for transitory protection against
infectious disease, the same type of patterns characterize the demand for perma-
nent protection through vaccination. Using data from the 1991 National Health
Interview Survey, Mullahy (1997) provides evidence on the prevalence-elasticity
of influenza vaccine demand. Each year in the US, anywhere from 10 to 50
million individuals contract influenza. In a typical year, about 20,000 of these
individuals, 90% of whom are elderly, die from complications of the disease.
During influenza season, the hospitalization of elderly patients reaches an an-
nual high, while influenza accounts for more than 10% of visits to doctors' offices
during peak flu season. Mullahy finds a high correlation between the demand
for vaccines and mortality risk, calculated as the product of disease prevalence
and the probability of mortality conditional on infection; high-risk groups such
as health care workers, individuals in areas with more recent outbreaks, orthe
elderly demand vaccines at relatively larger rates. This relationship is illustrated
for the elderly in Figure 5, which gives the age-profile of flu vaccine demand.
INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE
Less than 5 percent of people below age 50 demand the vaccine, but demand
rises sharply for individuals older than that, until about half the population
over 70 demands vaccination. The much higher risk of mortality faced bythe
elderly explains this dramatic change in demand; the risk of mortality condi-
tional on infection rises very sharply in age and in fact resembles the age-profile
of demand, as one would expect.
29Also investigating the demand for vaccines, Philipson (1996) shows that
the prevalence-elasticity of demand for the child combination vaccine against
measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) parallels the prevalence-elasticityof HIV
and influenza vaccination.27 The paper used data from the National Health
Interview Survey (NHIS) on US measles vaccination between 1984 and 1991, as
well as a child health supplement from the 1991 NHIS; these data are combined
\vith measles case loads in the respondents' states of residence, as reported by
CDC's Morbidity and Mortality Weekly. Due to a measles outbreak between
1989 and 1991, the data display sufficient variation across states and time to
permit the estimation of prevalence-elasticity for the MMR vaccine.The paper
identifies the main dependent variable of interest as the duration represented
by the age in months at which a child obtains her first MMR vaccination.The
study finds that regional case load, a time varying covariate, has a large positive
impact on the hazard rate into vaccination. Using a proportionalhazards model,
the effects on duration of a large set of control variables is investigated. These
controls include several measures of public health policies aimed at stimulating
demand in the respondent's state of residence. Prevalence exerts a large and
highly significant positive effect on the hazard rate into vaccination. Indeed,
disease prevalence affects the hazard rate more than any other determinants of
vaccination completion, and this relationship persists across a variety of spec-
ifications. The results of this study have also been confirmed by Conroy and
Fische (1996), who also find strong support for a prevalence-elastic demand
using the same type of data from NHIS.
We have summarized a wide variety of evidence for the prevalence-elasticity
of demand for prevention of infectious disease. A major drawback of the studies
is that they do not identify why demand is prevalence elastic. In particular,
empirically it is not known how information gets transmitted during the growth
of a disease. Part of the transmission occurs in the private sector through mass
media, but part of it also is attributable to public efforts at surveillance.Future
empirical work should better attempt to assess the process by whichinformation
is disseminated. If such prevalence-elastic demand is identified in future studies,
our arguments demonstrate that it has many important implicationsfor both the
behavior of infectious diseases as well as the effects of public health interventions
aimed at controlling their spread.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed recent economic analysis of public health policies and
infectious disease. The discussion focused on three general questions which
reveal how the economic approach offers unique insights into the behavior of
disease and optimal public health interventions, insights which epidemiology
cannot provide. We first examined the difference between the disease behavior
predicted by the economic approach and that predicted by epidemiology.We
concluded that incentives for prevention make epidemics self-limiting, because
27See also Goldstein et at (1996).
30the prevalence of a disease raises the incentives for preventive behavior. Second,
we examined the different implications for public health policy offered by the
economic approach and the epidemiological approach. The economic approach
yields the insight that public intervention often provides less benefit than pre-
dicted by epidemiology, because private incentives counteract its effects. Lastly,
we compared the different ways in which economics and epidemiology evaluate
the cost of disease. Here we found that epidemiology focuses only on part of
the cost, and misses the sizable costs of disease-avoidance. This focus causes
epidemiology to stress the prevalence of a disease as the key determinant of its
cost. We found this focus misplaced, because the total welfare loss imposed by
a disease has more to do with the severity of the disease and the steps people
take to avoid it.
The growth in economic analysis of infectious disease has been substantial
but many important areas remain open for future work. For example, future
work could examine how the endogenous matching of infected and uninfected in-
dividuals would change the predictions generated by dynamic models of disease
growth. Second, researchers should more fully explore how asymmetric informa-
tion about the disease status of sex partners reduces the volume of sexual trades
and thereby limits the growth of STDs such as AIDS. Third, economic analysis
should be brought to bear on the unique issues surrounding disease control in
low-income countries.28 Empirically, much more work is needed on the sources
and determinants of the prevalence-elasticity of demand for prevention; such
analysis could help reveal why certain subpopulations engage in less prevention
than others as seems to be the case in many African countries. One major
difference between rich and poor countries is that in poor countries, AIDS is
spread though markets, namely prostitutes. Therefore, sexual behavior may be
less prevalence-elastic if the market responds more in price than in quantity to
the lowered quality of supply implied by more infected prostitutes.
More generally, the burgeoning field of economic epidemiology offers sev-
eral promising directions for future research. Of course, epidemiology, despite
its name,29 comprises more than just the study of infectious diseases, and eco-
nomic analysis of other areas within the field seem useful avenues for future
research. One such area is the design and analysis of clinical trials.30 Although
there exists a substantial literature on evaluation of social programs through
methods of random assignments of treatments in econometrics, the special fea-
tures of clinical trials are plentiful and have not been addressed. A second area
is the examination of the normative approach to disease control advocated by
epidemiologists, for infectious and non-infectious diseases. This approach con-
sists of discovering and estimating the most important covariates of disease3'
25However, see the chapter by Paul Gertler in this Hendbook.
29Epidemiology stems from two Greek words; the word for epidemics (epidemia) and the
word for the study of (logos). I thank Charles Phelps for this extension of my Greek vocabu-
lary.
30See, e.g., Philipson and DeSimone (1997) and Philipson and Hedges (1998).
31So called 'risk-factors' which consist of the significant regressors in equations with disease
occurence as the dependent variable.
31and then, in a great leap of faith, recommending private or public intervention
aimed at controlling the most empirically important covariates. Our analy-
sis suggests that there is little role for public prevention of non-communicable
diseases, and that the crowding out of prevention limits the benefits for commu-
nicable diseases as well. It seems natural to inquire into the conditions under
which this canonical approach makes sense from the standpoint of Pareto op-
timality. It seems clear that high-risk targeting often favored by such analysis
may not be efficient since a high risk group, by definition, has high costs of
prevention relative to benefits. A primary example of this is the continued
advocacy of partner reduction programs for the African prostitutes who make
up the so called 'core groups' of the HIV epidemic in those countries. Since
earnings are proportional to partners for these workers, such programs are the
equivalent of grant-reduction programs for academics, which presumably would
have a similarly low take-up rate.
To end on an optimistic note, it seems that epidemiology is an area where
economics as a social science may successfully compete with and outperform the
natural sciences. Economics can provide theories which explain more phenom-
ena and assess more precisely disease-control efforts more precisely. Despite its
recent growth, the field remains in its infancy relative to its possibilities. The
global importance of world-wide mortality caused by infectious disease ensures
that such research will pay valuable dividends by improving the understanding
of the way infectious diseases spread, and the ways individuals and institutions
can control them.
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AgeTable 1:Duration in years before start of main aids prevention program
Fiscal Year Total LeftStarters Survival [95% Conf.Interval]
1986/87 51 12 0.7647 0.6229 0.8589
1887/88 39 7 0.6275 0.4801 0.7437
1888/89 32 5 0.5294 0.3847 0.6548
1889/90 27 18 0.1765 0.0869 0.2916
1990/91 9 1 0.1569 0.0734 0.2688
1992/93 8 0 0.1569 0.0734 0.2688
Source: Computed using data from the AIDS Policy Center, Intergovernmental Health Policy
Project, George Washington University.
1Table 2:
Condom Use (Proportion) by Quartiles of State—of—Residence Prevalence per
100,000 Populaton for 25-27 Year Olds [Data Source: NLSY, Selected Years]
Single, Married
Single Men Sexually Men in
Quartile! Men and Men Singlein UrbanActiveMarriedUrban
p-valuesWomen Only Men Areas Men Men Areas
1984
First 0.0850.1050.106 0.103 0.145 0.104 0.132
Second 0.082 0.1080.074 0.048 0.085 0.146 0.150
Third 0.075 0.0950.104 0.082 0.121 0.080 0.051
Fourth 0.0980.1180.092 0.106 0.122 0.166 0.165
p-values 0.4810.6760.714 0.934 0.667 0.232 0.586
0.6510.8930.787 0.415 0.709 0.317 0.176
1986
First 0.0750.0670.055 0.076 0.078 0.078 0.087
Second 0.080 0.0990.088 0.103 0.117 0.112 0.095
Third 0.067 0.0720.078 0.087 0.109 0.064 0.073
Fourth 0.072 0.1050.085 0.092 0.101 0.136 0.155
p-values 0.823 0.1000.296 0.632 0.577 0.123 0.126
0.8330.2170.680 0.884 0.806 0.196 0.223
1988
First 0.1030.1280.163 0.178 0.184 0.081 0.077
Second 0.1120.1460.158 0.118 0.161 0.127 0.151
Third 0.1310.1740.222 0.228 0.256 0.086 0.076
Fourth 0.1580.1910.225 0.248 0.228 0.118 0.113
p-values 0.001 0.0130.067 0.064 0.329 0.310 0.431
0.004 0.0610.073 0.002 0.117 0.478 0.229
1990
First 0.120 0.1520.213' 0.222 0.253 0.082 0.132
Second 0.159 0.2140.244 0.245 0.268 0.174 0.177
Third 0.1780.2320.309 0.334 0.293 0.129 0.121
Fourth 0.1940.2660.305 0.325 0.341 0.208 0.220
p-values 0.0000.0000.024 0.025 0.103 0.001 0.074
0.001 0.0010.058 0.038 0.367 0.009 0.143
Notes: The categories of states represent the quartile of the annual population—weighted
dirtribution of the state prevelence—per—100,000--population. For each quartile, the entry in
the proportion of observations who used condoms last month. The p-value entries take the
form p1; p2, where p1 is the p-value associated with the hypothesis that the incidence of
condom use in the first quartile is equal to that in the fourth, and p2 is for the test of the null
hypothesis of no difference in condomn use across the four quartiles. All results are based on
weighted statistics from the NLSY.
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